Comment on Iovino, La'O and Mascarenhas, 'Optimal Monetary Policy with an Informationally-Constrained Central Banker'
Abstract
Iovino, La’O and Mascarenhas ask two important questions regarding the optimal conduct of monetary policy: Should the central bank’s policy depend on information the central bank has that is not available to markets? And should the central bank disclose information that it has but market participants do not? Iovino, La’O and Mascarenhas answer these questions using a simple, stylized model with one-period price stickiness. They show that efficient equilibria can be sustained regardless of whether policy depends on the central bank’s information and regardless of its disclosure policy. We explain the logic behind their irrelevance result and show that if restrictions are imposed on equilibria, then monetary policy should in general depend on the central banks information. Finally, we offer some speculative answers to their questions and discuss the sense in which policy is converging towards theory.
